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REFLECTIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN
EASTERN EUROPE
Jonathan D. Varat *
In the apocryphal exchange between an American anxious to
improve the aesthetics of his yard and an archetypical Englishman,
the American asks, "How can I have a lawn as beautiful as yours?"
The Englishman's reply: "Start growing your lawn six hundred
years ago!" The most effective advice on how to grow constitutional democracy in the countries that we probably inaccurately
group together as belonging to Eastern Europe might take a similar
tack. Successful constitutional democracy in the West, particularly
in the United States, Britain, and a number of Commonwealth nations, did not sprout all at once. It grew, with sporadic freedomenhancing measures that fertilized its soil, from at least the time of
Magna Charta in 1215. Not only were there many periods ~uring
which constitutional democracy was fragile or vulnerable, but any
serious reader of history must be aware that its stable maintenance
is unusual and that it must constantly be tended in order to assure
its survival and flourishing. Most importantly, it must be tended
not just by the government agents of the populace, but by the people
themselves through their participation and their firm, preferably
peaceful, insistence on its preservation.
The establishment of constitutional government is both an idealistic and a practical undertaking. It is idealistic in its recognition
that all human beings are entitled by virtue of their humanity to
certain basic freedoms and to government that operates in the interest of their welfare. It is mundanely practical insofar as it is premised on the recognition of human ambition and self-interest, and
the dangers that those human qualities present when combined with
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. ©
1991. This paper was delivered in East Berlin at the International Conference on Western
Democracy and Eastern Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Changes. The Conference,
held from October 14-18, 1991, was sponsored jointly by the Federal Center for Political
Education, Federal Republic of Germany, and the Center for Civic Education, Los Angeles,
California. I wish to thank the co-sponsors for inviting me to prepare this talk and for providing an audience of participants from ten or more nations.
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the bestowal of political power. It is also intensely practical in its
search for mechanisms of government structure and enforcement of
procedural and substantive freedoms that successfully will constrain
the abuse of government power without disabling it entirely.
By "establishing constitutional government," I mean not just
the creation of a written document that purports to create the political structure of a nation and guarantee rights to its people, but
"constitutionalism" in the sense of meaningful and effective adherence to constitutional norms of democratic organization and the
protection of individual liberty, even when the cost of that adherence is the sacrifice of what seems temporarily expedient. To hold
to a fundamental and stable framework of democratic, liberty-respecting values despite the most tumultuous of policy disagreements
among a nation's contending factions is the essence of the constitutional spirit.
Much ink has been spilled arguing against the admittedly antimajoritarian features of constitutional, as distinguished from pure,
democracy .1 One powerful form of rebuttal to that position invokes
the primacy of securing the "Blessings of Liberty" above even democratic control. Not the grace of government, democratically or
otherwise selected, but the inalienable and natural rights of human
beings, are the source of our rights to freedom of conscience, to
privacy, or to religious choice, for example. The "moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a
whole"z establishes that a person's natural rights precede the state
and that government, even democratic government, must justify its
need to interfere with natural rights. Government cannot dispense
what it does not rightly hold, and even a democratic positivism
therefore cannot dispense or condition basic human freedoms.
Unlike the anti-positivist natural rights position, a second line
of rebuttal assumes the relevance of the democratic standard. It
insists, however, that what is antimajoritarian is not necessarily antidemocratic. Indeed, in choosing what elements to establish as
minimum constitutional conditions that cannot be altered without
invoking a legitimate constitutional amendment process, those elements that crucially support the long-term sustenance of democratic forms of government-such as rights of political
participation, and freedom of speech, press, and association-must
be put beyond the reach of current majorities precisely in order to
I. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633, 63643 (1991 ), for a probing response to this claim. My discussion here borrows heavily from
Sunstein's useful account.
2. Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 288 (1977).
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preserve a vital range of democratic decisionmaking by future majorities. Expressive freedoms, including freedom of inquiry, thus
are justified both as natural rights of the person and as instrumental
rights in the maintenance of a healthy, democratic regime, and so
the guarantee of their protection is preeminently indispensable in
establishing constitutional government. I can do no better than to
quote Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme Court:
Freedom to speak and to write about public questions is as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human
body. In fact, the privilege is the heart of our government. If
that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled,
the result is death.3
More particularly, the absolute freedom of individuals to criticize their government must be guaranteed if constitutional democracy is to survive. That is why it is so disheartening to discover that
the most recent draft of the Romanian Constitution apparently
would, among other questionable limits on freedom of expression,
allow the government to restrict the right to defame the country or
the government. 4 As a distinguished American law professor first
wrote a generation ago:
[P]olitical freedom ends when government can use its powers and
its courts to silence its critics. [T]he presence or absence in the
law of the concept of seditious libel defines the society .... If ...
it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society, no matter what its other characteristics.s
Structural elements of constitutions that depart from pure majoritarianism--or even from pure proportional representation-may
also be justified as strategies for preserving liberty, by dividing and
balancing power. When a bicameral legislature's second house is
not elected strictly according to population, as when it is apportioned by constituent sub-sovereigns of a federal nation, the design
is to introduce a different perspective that will promote more prudent deliberation from distinctive viewpoints and offset the possibility of majority tyranny. Separating the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, and dividing legislative competence between national and constituent republics or states, are also designed to estab3. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 301-02
(1941).
4. Summary Report of Proceedings, Central and Eastern European Law Initiative
Technical Assistance Workshop on the Draft Romanian Constitution 2 (August 19-23,
1991).
5. Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 63 (H~rper
& Row, 1988).
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lish competing centers of power to foster more sustained reflection
before government's coercive power is brought to bear on the citizenry and to thwart the concentration of power in one or a small set
of hands that is the very definition of tyranny. These multiple centers of power, superimposed on the innate ambitions of human personalities, can act to prevent domination by one center because of
the resistance of the others. The theory of constitutionalism rejects
the romantic notion of utopian societies consisting of altruistic individuals. It does not assume cooperation for the good of the people,
but creates a structure that forces cooperation, dialogue, and compromise. It presupposes that the different centers possess real
power, for without that condition the practice will not match the
theory. That is only one reason why it has been so crucial in American constitutionalism, at least, that the judicial branch was made
independent by providing the appointed justices with life tenure and
guarantees that their salaries will not be reduced-in retaliation for
decisions unpopular with other government officials or for any
other reason.
The arresting notion, recently elaborated by Professor Sunstein, that there are some subjects whose legislative examination
might be so debilitating to the political process that they should be
constitutionalized beyond the reach of politics also deserves mention.6 Sunstein suggests that keeping potentially explosive and intractable issues such as private property or religion off the political
agenda by constitutional prohibitions on their infringement may facilitate the political process by limiting factional conflict in
government.
A little elaboration of the religion example may be helpful. Besides acting as an additional support for the constitutional right
freely to exercise one's religion, the American Constitution's first
amendment ban on government establishment of religion was
designed to liberate politics from religious strife. The "belief that a
union of government and religion tends to destroy government and
to degrade religion"7 has animated Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Bulgarian draft constitution, by denominating the Eastem Orthodox Church as the "traditional Bulgarian religion," 8 and
the Polish government's introduction of religion into public school
activities,9 dangerously ignore the pragmatic underpinnings of that
6. Sunstein, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 639-40 (cited in note 1).
7. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
8. Constitutional Reform in Bulgaria: A Summary Report of a Workshop, The American Bar Association Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI) 3 (June 19-22,
1991) ("CEELI Report").
9. Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitu-
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belief.
That departures from leaving all matters to majoritarian political processes are sometimes justified to secure human freedom or to
facilitate democratic rule does not mean, of course, that any lesser
justification will do, or that any such justification ought not to be
scrutinized carefully before adopting particular norms as constitutionally fundamental and so beyond the reach of ordinary politics.
A constitutional democracy is legitimate only insofar as the government derives its power from the consent of the governed, and the
necessity of having agents of the people exercise government power
introduces the separate interests of government officials in the maintenance of their own positions as an additional factor needing control-a factor surely known all too well among the peoples of
Central and Eastern Europe. Controlling even democratically
elected agents by effectively rendering them subject to the rule of
law is a key ingredient of constitutional democracy. Assuming the
will exists to make democratic politics and respect for human rights
the norm, and to establish power-allocating arrangements that will
effectuate those aims, we need to address the realities of internal and
international context in which the constitutional creation process
must take place, and the specific content of the provisions that
ought to be built into each country's constitutional framework.
Neither nation by nation analysis, nor a comprehensive delineation
of what a workable constitution should include, is possible here.
Some limited observations may be of interest, however.
A realist must begin with the conditions in which those who
would create constitutional democracy find themselves. In Central
and Eastern Europe the conditions are hardly ideal. The transition
from authoritarian communist systems to free democratic regimes
must overcome significant impediments. Transition is itself always
difficult. In this instance, economic impoverishment and uncertainty about the nature of the future economic system-especially
the scope and intensity of the commitment to privatization and the
development of a market economy-must be resolved at the same
time that political reform occurs. to
tiona/ Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 595, 606 n.24 (1991) ("In
August 1990, two weeks before the beginning of the school year and without any prior consultations with Parliament. the government issued a regulation introducing religion in public
schools, despite the fact that public opinion polls had indicated that most parents opposed the
move. [Although it removed the issue from the presidential election campaign,] very little
attention seems to have been paid to its long-term consequences on the separation of church
and state.")
10. See Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555, 557
( 1991) ("Eastern Europe faces three problems: the first is that of transition; the second is the
pressing need to deal with the questions of racial and ethnic divisions; and the third is its
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One or the other would be challenge enough. Simultaneous
political and economic reform is doubly challenging. It is not that
one should be delayed in favor of the other; that would risk the
accomplishment of neither. Economic freedom and vitality, on the
one hand, and political liberty and democratic vigor, on the other,
are too interconnected to believe that constitutionalism can take
hold without both. One need not embrace the view that capitalism
and its failings should remain virtually unregulated to agree with
the general point that "[p]olitical and intellectual freedom cannot
be achieved without economic freedom." 11 Indeed, it is worth reflecting on the degree to which the habit of freedom, independence,
and responsibility that accompanies the liberty to choose how one
will employ one's private property and talents in economic pursuits
reinforces expectations of freedom in other personal and social pursuits-and vice-versa. But the enormity of the task of transition
should not escape attention.
The challenge of peacefully containing and resolving long-repressed ethnic and cultural tensions in nations without a tolerance
for multi-cultural pluralism is also formidable. Even in the United
States, with its long history of stable democracy, these are formidable challenges. When heterogeneity of language and culture assume
more significant proportions, the difficulties of constitutional resolution increase dramatically, as Canada's recent experience with separatist sentiment in Quebec makes clear. The draft provisions of
Bulgaria's constitution that would restrict the political activities of
ethnic and religious groups12 unfortunately succumb to the temptation of repressing these differences rather than resolving them
through inclusion by guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for
all, or by other means. Both for reasons of respect for human rights
and for promoting democratic stability in multi-ethnic nations, the
proposed Bulgarian approach is exactly backwards.
Adding to the difficulties of Eastern European transition to
constitutional democracy is the absence of competitive established
inability to forge a durable social consensus on the necessity of strong institutions of private
property for both political liberty and economic growth.'')
II. Alex Kozinski, The Dark Lessons of Utopia, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575, 58 I (1991),
citing Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (U. of Chi. Press, 1982). Timothy Garton
Ash, in his perceptive chronicle, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague 148-49 (Random House, 1990), captured the beliefs of
the "opposition movements throughout East Central Europe" by suggesting that what they
were saying was:
Civil rights and property rights, economic freedom and political freedom, financial
independence and intellectual independence, each supports the other. So, yes, we
want to be citizens, but we also want to be middle-class, in the senses that the
majority of citizens in the more fortunate half of Europe are middle-class.
12. CEELI Report at 2 (cited in note 8).
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political parties, experienced democratic movements, or organized
defenders of human rights. That is not entirely as true of some
countries in the region, such as CzechoslovakiaD and Poland, as it
is of others. Yet one of the ravages of Communist domination was
surely the enfeebling or destruction of organized opposition groups.
More generally, the absence of a history incorporating strong elements of constitutional democracy, checked powers, and the rule of
law makes growing the green grass of liberty a prodigious
undertaking.
Although there surely are other major barriers to surmount,
the last one I will mention is the potential military insecurity of the
region. The task of democratic reform must be complicated to the
extent that military power occupies a prominent place on a nation's
agenda. Because of economic cost, the historical truth that military
needs are often satisfied at the expense of individual or political freedom, and the human inability simultaneously to wage or be prepared for war and to perfect democracy, a primary focus on
military security will drain the energy needed to build a workable
constitutionalism. Among other unfortunate lessons, the recent experience in Yugoslavia tends to confirm this one.
Correctly reminding us that eighteenth century arguments in
favor of ratification of the proposed United States Constitution primarily concentrated on the "geostrategic" advantages of union in
combatting external threats and eliminating the potential for armed
hostilities among the States, Professor Amar, addressing the current
situation in Eastern Europe, contends that "the success of democracy in individual countries depends heavily on demilitarization of
the entire region."J4 He further suggests that the "key point for
Europeans today is that internal constitutional reform is not
enough."1s Instead, "[c]ontinental legal institutions like the EEC
and NATO must be developed or expanded to create a continental
environment conducive to commerce and demilitarization."J6
However much I agree that "economic cooperation and demilitarization went hand in hand under the Federalist [United States]
Constitution[,]" 11 and that demilitarization across Eastern Europe
would not only be desirable in its own right but would facilitate
democratic reform efforts in the countries located there, I fear that
13. See Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia:
E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 513-17, 519-20 (1991).
14. Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
483. 494 (1991).
15. ld. at 497.
16. Id.
17. ld. at 496.
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what ultimately may prove to be unsuccessful efforts to achieve regional demilitarization will be used as an excuse for failing to proceed firmly with the consolidation of internal reforms. Certainly
internal reform ought not to be postponed while these nations await
the arrival of demilitarization. Nor would it be wise, in my opinion,
to draw attention away from necessary internal reforms to concentrate on international security arrangements. It is always easier,
personally and nationally, to look outward rather than inward to
solve enduring problems, but it is also less valuable in the long run.
The threat of military confrontation is a major distraction from
sound constitution-making that must be addressed, but taking on
too much in that sphere should not be allowed to substitute for the
painstaking construction of constitutional government. For now,
"internal constitutional reform" is enough and should receive
priority.
The lesson to be drawn from a realistic understanding of the
current Eastern European predicament is not one of despair but of
recognition of the genuine elements that may jeopardize successful
conversion to democratic, liberty-preserving politics, and a dedication to grappling with those problems. Positive factors supporting
constitutional reform coexist with negative factors that stand in its
way. Most fundamentally, the fresh air of freedom is blowing
through the region and is being inhaled by broad segments of society who yearn for more and are willing to work hard to keep it
circulating. The momentum for establishing constitutional government is abroad, not just in one nation, but in many, and it is supported by most of the world. The availability of modem
communications technology increases the potential for sharing
democratic hopes, successes, information, and ideas. With the end
of the Cold War and the rapprochement between the United States
and the countries comprising the former Soviet Union, more constructive uses of the diplomatic energies of the superpowers can be
bent towards the support of burgeoning democracy. At the very
least, Soviet power is no longer being deployed against democratic
reform. If anything, the Soviet Union's successor nations have redirected their energies towards liberalization.
More tangibly, the international processes of the Western European democracies are available to support-indeed in some instances to demand-constitutional reform before lending assistance.
Not only NATO and the EEC, but the European Court of Human
Rights, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission of
Human Rights, are available. The Czech and Slovak Federative
Republic (CSFR), for one, has made it possible for their citizens to
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petition the Commission by joining the Council, and the CSFR apparently intends to "accede to the jurisdiction of the European
Court" as well. Is Recently the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe apparently agreed to improve the prospects for adherence to the human rights obligations of the Helsinki Accords by
authorizing fact-finding missions to investigate suspected human
rights violations within member nations whenever ten member nations or senior CSCE officials approved-although it stopped short
of adopting more intrusive enforcement mechanisms. None of these
international measures can or should operate in lieu of domestic
mechanisms for policing government abuses, but they ought to buttress the adoption and execution of domestic constitutional reforms.
Furthermore, the prospect of broader European economic integration cannot help but assist in the arduous transition to workable
market economies.
The hardships and tensions confronting the nations of Eastern
Europe, as each moves at its own pace and in its own direction
toward democratization, cannot easily be compared with the very
different historical, social, and economic conditions of the American States during the period from 1776-1787 when they broke from
Britain as a group, together fought a war for independence, and
then struggled their way towards "a more perfect Union" embodied
in the United States Constitution. Not the least of the differences is
that the American States possessed market rather than planned socialist economies and that the American States shared with Britain
some democratic and libertarian traditions and codified some of
those traditions in their own liberal constitutions at the moment of
independence. Although both groups of new sovereigns gained independence from the hegemony of a previously controlling empire,
the local embrace of communist control in Eastern Europe was certainly more pervasive than the colonial embrace of British control.
The considerable room left to the geographically remote American
colonies for developing democratic institutions has no counterpart
in Eastern Europe, and a primary common language in the colonies
surely facilitated those developments in a way that the linguistic
barriers within and among the nations of Eastern Europe does not
so readily allow.
Yet, interestingly, despite the differences between these two
otherwise strikingly disparate periods of constitutional creation, the
initial thrust of their respective constitution-makers was and is to
secure constitutional government primarily through reliance on a
democratically elected legislative body. The first state constitutions
18.

Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 537 (cited in note 13).
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following the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain
wholly embraced popular sovereignty in the course of rejecting rule
by the King, 19 just as a number of Eastern European nations appear
to be embracing democratic legislative supremacy in the wake of
arbitrary executive and judicial rule.2o Perhaps on this point Eastern Europe can benefit from the American experience, for the early
State constitutions were soon found wanting for lack of effectiveness
in controlling legislative power. By the time the federal Constitution was formulated 11 years later, a stronger system of checks and
balances, an increased role for courts in imposing constitutional restraints on legislative authority, and express provisions prohibiting
certain kinds of legislative arbitrariness and regulation were all
deemed necessary to preserve the constitutional freedoms of the
populace.21
When recent experience consists of executive and judicial authority arrayed against political and individual liberty, it is understandable that the initial reaction is to rely on elected legislators to
preserve democracy. As the American states learned, however,
there are also significant risks in putting too many constitutional
democratic eggs in one legislative basket. Reform, not rejection,
proved to be the wiser course. A system of checks and balances
prominently featuring an independent judiciary proved to hold the
best hope of subjecting all government officials, including legislative
officials, to the rule of law.
In the course of my comments about the nature of constitutional democracy and the internal and international context within
which Eastern European efforts at constitutional creation must take
place, I have suggested a number of specific provisions that appear
crucial to the success of the enterprise at hand. It would be arrogant, and in any event beyond the scope of this discussion and my
ability, to suggest a detailed constitutional document that is best for
each of the diverse nations that comprise Eastern and Central Europe. Certainly no one constitution would serve all equally well.
Nor would I contend that every feature of the United States
Constitution, or even all of its major elements, should be adopted.
19. See Herman Belz, Constitutionalism and the American Founding, in 2 Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution 480, 483-84 (MacMillan, 1986).
20. See, e.g., Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 13) (noting
that President Havel's proposals for "direct election of the president and the expansion of
presidential powers run counter to the parliamentary tradition of Czechoslovakia's earlier
democratic experience, and to the widespread concern about a return of dictatorship");
Rapaczynski. 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 623-25 (cited in note 9) (discussing the "Polish Preference
for a Powerful Legislature"); Summary Report of Proceedings at 10 (cited in note 4) (noting
the Romanian draft Constitution's "tilt in favor of the legislative branch").
21. See Belz. 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution at 484 (cited in note 19).
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The United States is a federal nation, unlike the majority of nations
in this region, and even the survival as federal nations of the CSFR,
the former USSR, and Yugoslavia is uncertain. Apart from the relevance of constitutional provisions concerning federalism, some
very basic questions of constitutional organization at the national
level sensibly could be resolved in ways quite different from the
American resolution. Powerful arguments have been made, for example, that parliamentary systems are more likely to secure democracy than presidential systems, especially in times of regime
transition and under conditions of a polarized, volatile electorate.22
The American success story is explained as an exception to a dominant historical pattern of greater stability and flexibility under parliamentary systems, which are said to be more effective at
responding to crises without the higher risk of "regime crisis" supposedly presented by presidential governments.23
A second major point of choice is whether legislative elections
ought to be based on the principle of majoritarian or proportional
representation. I tend to agree with Professor Rapaczynski's critique24 of the Polish preference for proportional representationespecially with his view that it is preferable that political coalitions
be constructed before elections, as majoritarian representation systems encourage, rather than after elections, as is more likely in a
proportional representation system. Nonetheless, I know of no reason to assume that constitutional democracy cannot succeed under
a system of proportional representation. Universal adult suffrage
with guarantees that each person's vote counts equally with every
other person's may be a prerequisite of a properly egalitarian constitutional democracy, but majoritarian representation, even if preferable, is not.
Having made these disclaimers, and with no pretense of being
exhaustive, there are several elements I would urge as central to
establishing a well-functioning constitutional democracy. Some are
specific to federal systems. Some are vital to any constitutional democracy, federal or unitary.
Federal systems are worth establishing and preserving for several reasons, including the crucial reason that citizens may look to
local power to resist central government abuse and to central government power to resist local government abuse.2s A successful
federal system will accommodate diversity without threatening
22. An excellent presentation of this view can be found in Juan J. Linz, The Perils of
Presidentialism. I Journal of Democracy 51 (1990).
23. ld. at 65.
24. Rapaczynski, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 616-21 (cited in note 9).
25. See Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 497-506 (cited in note 14). See also Michael W.
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unity. To maximize the advantages of unification and diversification, and to resolve the tensions between them, is a formidable task,
however, and three successful features of the United States Constitution furnish a valuable paradigm.
First, Article IV of the Constitution, the States' Relations Article, contains a variety of measures mandating cooperation among
the constituent States, obligating the central government to protect
their democratic integrity, and guaranteeing citizens in each that
they will not suffer unwarranted discrimination when they enter
and operate in any other State.z6 Provisions designed to inculcate
the reality of being bound together in a common nation are absolutely essential to a federal system. The guarantee of interstate
equality embodied in Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause,
moreover, is not only designed to enhance political union but to
secure equal treatment of individuals regardless of where they live
in that union.21 The notion that an interstate or inter-republic
equality provision is crucial to political unification also may increase the likelihood that other proposals aimed at binding the national and constituent governments to provide equal protection of
the laws to their own citizens will be more readily appreciated on
similar grounds of moral fairness and political integration. The
more occasions for recognizing the appeal of equality, the more
likely it is that the populace will become habituated to equality
values.
Second, freedom of movement, temporary or indefinite, from
one part of a federal nation to another must be guaranteed as a basic
right. In addition to the obvious liberty dimension of that right, its
protection will invigorate the competitive incentive for a federal nation's constituent governments to foster conditions that will at a
minimum not drive its people to go elsewhere. That incentive, in
turn, should provide the populace with a better, less stagnant set of
living choices.zs
Third, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution mandates that the
federal constitution, federal laws, and treaties "shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land" before which conflicting state law must fall. The
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1504-07
(1987).
26. See generally Jonathan D. Varat, Economic Integration and Interregional Migration
in the United States Federal System ("Economic Integration"), in Mark Tushnet, ed., Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America 44-45 (Greenwood Press, 1990)
("Comparative Constitutional Federalism").
27. See Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 487 (1981 ).
28. Varat, Economic Integration, in Tushnet, ed., Comparative Constitutional Federalism at 34 (cited in note 26).
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Supremacy Clause is a necessary rule of conflict resolution that permits local law to experiment and operate unless and until the national representatives of the people, or the fundamental law of their
Constitution, indicate that national interests require a uniform governing rule. Without it, political unification is seriously endangered. That is why it is so disappointing to learn that the Czech and
Slovak Federative Republic is unlikely to adopt a similar provision.29 Given the presence of democratic opportunities to change or
abandon uniform national rules, and to amend the Constitution,
there is normally no justification for extralegal measures, and as between the choice of national or local law, the law of the more
broadly represented constituency has the greater claim to
legitimacy.
Even within a unitary government, supremacy of the Constitution as paramount law is vital to the ability of the people to control
their elected or appointed government agents. Executive, administrative, legislative, or judicial action-all must be conducted within
the limits of constitutional authorization. Constitutional limitations
must be understood as binding law, not just aspirational ideals.
Their designation in the nation's fundamental document as supreme
and binding law facilitates the successful checking of those officials
who would be tempted to intrude on power allocated elsewhere in
government or on protected freedoms. The commitment of all to
abide by the Constitution is most effective when it is a commitment
to the rule of law that places certain actions beyond the realm of
acceptability and beyond the reach of ordinary politics to authorize.
An independent judiciary not beholden to any other officials
for their tenure or compensation can be used, of course, as one
method of enforcing the Constitution as supreme, binding law.
Sometimes it may be the only effective method of checking the invasion of the rights of unpopular or powerless minorities. Even if that
enforcement power is withheld from the judiciary-an unfortunate
choice, I think-the paramount law status of constitutional principles remains important as a guide to those, including the electorate,
who do possess enforcement power.
Of separate import, an independent judiciary is essential for the
interpretation and application of nonconstitutionallaw as well. Unimpeded opportunity to manipulate and compromise the integrity
of law, whatever its source or status, could not be more corrosive of
constitutional democracy. In short, the repeated calls for the establishment of independent judiciaries in Eastern Europe are sound no
matter what the law the judiciary is asked to enforce, and even
29.

Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 528-29 (cited in note 13).
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more compelling when the judiciary is charged with constitutional
enforcement.
Because armed organizations pose a special potential danger to
democratic freedom, it is also critical that democratic constitutions
provide for control of military and paramilitary organizations by
electorally accountable civilian representatives. Again the aim is to
control the people's agents so that they carry out democratic policy
rather than making and enforcing their own. The reported intentions of Hungary and Romania to require parliamentary authorization for military deployment are promising first steps in this
direction.3o
One right that ought not to be included in a federal constitution is the right of a constituent government to secede. The Soviet
Constitution includes that right; Croatia and Slovenia have created
one for themselves; and a draft of the Slovak constitution would do
the same.3' It is not that secession will, or necessarily ought to be
prevented by omitting a constitutional right to secede. Rather, as
Professor Sunstein argues, "constitutional recognition of the right
to secede" threatens "ordinary democratic processes" by diverting
attention from the substance of policy, allowing "minority vetoes on
important issues," and encouraging destructive strategic behavior.32
As he urges, "waiver of the right to secede should be seen as a natural part of constitutionalism. "33
The right to amend the Constitution is quite a different story.
If a constitution is to express the fundamental principles of democratic organization and human liberty within the bounds of which
democratic policymaking is to occur, it should not be as readily
amendable as ordinary legislation. On the other hand, providing
for the power to amend through a supermajoritarian process, in order to reflect changes in the society's fundamental values or to correct judicial or other official interpretations at odds with widespread
views of what the Constitution does or should mean, leaves open
the necessary avenue for peaceful evolution instead of violent
revolution. This is precisely what Article V of the U.S. Constitution does.
In paying some attention to Article IV regarding relations
among States, the amendment process addressed in Article V, and
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, I deliberately have sought to
supplement the more frequently noted features of the separation of
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 509 n.84 (cited in note 14).
Sunstein, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 634 nn.5 and 6 (cited in note I).
ld. at 670.
ld.
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the legislative, executive, and judicial branches in Articles I, II, and
Ill, and the Bill of Rights Amendments that followed the Constitution adopted at Philadelphia. Having filled in some blanks, let me
briefly return to the question of what personal rights it is wise to
include and exclude from the basic constitutional document. The
centrality of freedoms of speech, press, political association, religion, and privacy has already been affirmed. Procedural freedoms
that are antidotes to the risk of arbitrary incarceration are equally
vital. These would include a number of components of fair process
for defending oneself against criminal charges.
What all of these freedoms generally have in common, whether
substantive or procedural, is that they are shields against the deployment of coercive government power. By contrast, several of
the draft Eastern European constitutions also contain provisions
purporting to guarantee affirmative or welfare rights, such as employment, education, and medical care. These include Czechoslovakia,34 Poland,3s and Romania.36 Though perhaps not surprising
for nations habituated to socialist experience, they raise potentially
profound issues regarding the status of constitutional rights as legally binding obligations. Even in the Czechoslovakian form of
split-level rights, under which those rights designed to keep government at bay are fully enforceable as a matter of constitutional law
and those obligating government to provide affirmative support are
only enforceable through implementing legislation,37 the risk that
"constitutional rights" will be understood generically, and will
sometimes not be understood as enforceable law, poses real concerns about nonenforcement when the occasion is more compelling
and the conditions for judicial enforcement are more realistic. Furthermore, principled arguments support reserving budgetary allocation decisions for democratic politics rather than constitutional
law.3s At the very least, one ought to think very seriously about
how belief in constitutional law may be affected generally by
promises that are not likely to be kept before enshrining such social
rights in a constitution.
A thriving constitutional democracy is one in which constitu34. See Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 535-36 (cited in note 13).
35. See Rapaczynski, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 611-13 (cited in note 9); Comments on the
Draft Polish Constitution, American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) 4-5 (July 5, 1991).
36. See Summary Report of Proceedings at 2-3 (cited in note 4).
37. See Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 536 (cited in note 13).
38. Compare Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 695, with Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 659, and Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 1336 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
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tional norms are regularly and meaningfully enforced and the contours of constitutional law are a routine part of public deliberation
and dialogue. In that kind of political system, constitutional law is
a common language binding people together, whatever the other
linguistic or cultural barriers that divide them. The value of that
common language, together with more observably tangible enforcement benefits, leads me to two final suggestions.
The first, primarily to guard against the most dangerous invocations of coercive government power, is to provide a constitutional
guarantee of independent judicial review of individual claims of illegal detention. The model in mind originated in the English writ of
habeas corpus, the minimum function of which is to assure an available regular mechanism for reviewing the validity of confinement.
The American Constitution provides that the "Great Writ" not be
suspended unless necessary during rebellion or invasion,39 and
although its supplemental scope may be left to legislative modification, even in its most modest form it performs a valuable service in
deterring and correcting instances of arbitrary imprisonment.
The second proposal also draws on the American experience.
Contrary to the centralized forums of judicial review adopted in
most European countries, I would urge consideration of a decentralized, fully integrated system of judicial review, in which courts
or other adjudicative bodies at every level possess the jurisdiction,
and assume the obligation, to measure any contested official act
against the requirements of the Constitution. When constitutional
issues are potentially part of any adjudicative proceeding, citizen
access to constitutional enforcement mechanisms multiplies and the
intersection of constitutional and nonconstitutional law becomes
more vivid.40
Some sort of Supreme Court would be needed to resolve conflicts in constitutional rulings at lower judicial levels, of course, but
the existence of potentially differing rulings should provide increased opportunities for reflection, debate, and attempts at persuasion concerning the resolution most consistent with the nation's
particular commitments to constitutional and democratic values.
The objective is not only more thoughtful resolution of potentially
intractable issues, but education and participatory struggle within a
tolerant, open democratic tradition. One should not underestimate
39. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
40. Insofar as the Polish draft Constitution separates "judicial review of legislation
from the review of the legality of executive and administrative action, vesting the latter power
in a special Administrative Tribunal" and the former in the Constitutional Tribunal, see
Rapaczynski, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 610 (cited in note 9), it sacrifices the benefits of an overview of the integrated legal system. In my view, that is unfortunate.
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the value of providing real opportunities for the broad-based embrace of peaceful debate about the proper content of constitutional
norms.
To infuse a nation with habits of constitutionalism is an imperative, if intangible goal. Beyond offering effective enforcement of
constitutional principles, universal judicial review holds great
promise in facilitating the adoption of constitutional law as a common language. It is a proposal deserving of serious examination.

